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Abstract
Conversation agents, commonly referred to as chatbots, are
increasingly deployed in many domains to allow people to
have a natural interaction while trying to solve a specific
problem. Given their widespread use, it is important to pro-
vide their users with methods and tools to increase users
awareness of various properties of the chatbots, including
non-functional properties that users may consider important
in order to trust a specific chatbot. For example, users may
want to use chatbots that are not biased, that do not use abu-
sive language, that do not leak information to other users, and
that respond in a style which is appropriate for the user’s cog-
nitive level.
In this paper, we address the setting where a chatbot cannot be
modified, its training data cannot be accessed, and yet a neu-
tral party wants to assess and communicate its trustworthiness
to a user, tailored to the user’s priorities over the various trust
issues. Such a rating can help users choose among alterna-
tive chatbots, developers test their systems, business leaders
price their offering, and regulators set policies. We envision
a personalized rating methodology for chatbots that relies on
separate rating modules for each issue, and users’ detected
priority orderings among the relevant trust issues, to generate
an aggregate personalized rating for the trustworthiness of a
chatbot. The method is independent of the specific trust is-
sues and is parametric to the aggregation procedure, thereby
allowing for seamless generalization. We illustrate its general
use, integrate it with a live chatbot, and evaluate it on four di-
alog datasets and representative user profiles, validated with
user surveys.
Introduction
Conversation is a hallmark of intelligence and a major way
in which humans communicate. This is why businesses
wanting to build AI-based systems to increase productiv-
ity and improve customer experience are interested in au-
tomated conversation systems, dialog systems, or chatbots.
There are many platforms available to create chatbots (Ac-
centure 2016; McTear, Callejas, and Griol 2016).
However, such systems can be fraught with ethical risks.
An extreme example is the Tay (Neff and Nagy 2017) Twit-
ter chatbot, released by Microsoft in 2016, that was designed
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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to engage with people on open topics and learn from feed-
back, but ended up getting manipulated by users to exhibit
unacceptable behavior via its extreme responses. Another
example is shown in Figure 1, where a chatbot to answer
train delay information may raise unexpected trust issues
(Mishra, Gaurav, and Srivastava 2018). It can become abu-
sive, leak user travel information to other users and devel-
opers and have incomprehensible conversational style (see
more examples in Illustration section later). More generally,
several potential ethical issues in dialogue systems built us-
ing learning methods can be identified, such as showing im-
plicit biases from data, being prone to adversarial examples,
being vulnerable to privacy violation, the need to maintain
safety of people, and concerns about explainability and re-
producibility of responses (Henderson et al. 2017).
Interested Parties and Their Concerns
After a chatbot is built, it is usually deployed as a shared ser-
vice available to users via Internet-connected devices (such
as computers or mobiles) or embodied systems (such as
robots, Amazon Alexa, or Google Home). In the process of
interaction, data is passed between the user and the chatbot
service provider. Many interested parties could be concerned
about the chatbot’s behavior. They include at least the fol-
lowing ones:
Users: Users are concerned with the value they derive by in-
teracting with the chatbot and expect it to follow social and
business norms similar to those they expect from human as-
sistants. One example is that the user’s information, whether
sensitive or otherwise, be not revealed to other users without
their permission. The repercussion of such a breach is not
only loss of trust but can also be illegal, depending on the
type of user (such as child, adult, patient, celebrity, govern-
ment official) and context of usage. This is further compli-
cated by the fact that, over time, a chatbot may get person-
alized to a user’s need but the person may not want to share
her personalized information with the developers. Another
user’s concern is the possible use of abusive language by the
chatbot. Yet another issue could be the use of language that
the user does not understand, because too complex or not
appropriate for his/her knowledge of the subject.
Developers: Developers want the chatbot to perform as per
design and may worry that it could say something which
gives an unintended perception to human users. Examples
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Figure 1: Sample interaction of a user with a train assistance chatbot for Indian railways (Mishra, Gaurav, and Srivastava 2018).
Trust issues: chatbot becoming abusive, leaking user travel information to other users and developers, having incomprehensible
conversational style.
Bias High Score Low Score
Ubuntu Mint seems better 1 no i just configured it 0
Insurance Which Company Has The Best Retirement Plan? 1 What Does Split Limits Mean In Auto Insurance? 0
HR Works pretty well needs some work with better answers, 0.69 I need to search the intranet to find an answer 0.01
fantastic for simple questions and quick info to your question.
Restaurant i hope prefer expensive restaurant 0.72 You are looking for a restaurant is that right? 0
Abuse High Score Low Score
Ubuntu bazang is a f*g1 1 and then take a look at the iptables? 0
Insurance no you not can get Life Insurance on a fetus the child have be 1 Can A Life Insurance Claim Be Denied? 0
born in most case at least 14 day old old before you can consider ...
HR Hi Chip, hoe do I setup Lotus notes? 0.5 I don’t know the answer to your question. Let me 0
try to find it on the intranet for you.
Restaurant - - pizza hut cherry hinton is a great restaurant 0
Complexity High Score Low Score
Ubuntu sudo adduser user group 1 that’s my impressions 0.25
Insurance will homeowners insurance cover flooring? 1 what are some examples of annuities? 0.5
HR are company email addresses case sensitive? 0.92 where am i? 0.33
Restaurant the lucky star serves Chinese food 0.94 coke it is 0.33
Table 1: Examples of utterances with high and low scores by issues.
of developers’ concerns are related to bias behavior (that is,
the chatbot should not be prone to erratic response in the
presence of protected variables like gender or race) and lan-
guage usage (that is, the chatbot should not respond with
hateful or abusive language).
Data providers: They provide data that is used by chat-
bots’ developers for the training phase, ranging from the
domain of discourse (e.g., financial data), encyclopedic in-
formation (e.g., Wikipedia), to language (e.g., Word embed-
dings). Data providers want to make sure their data is of the
best quality feasible.
Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we address the setting where a chatbot cannot
be modified and its training data cannot be accessed, and a
neutral party wants to assess and communicate the trustwor-
thiness of chatbots in the context of a user’s priorities over
the issues. Such a rating can help users choose among alter-
native chatbots, developers test their systems, business lead-
ers price their offering, and regulators set policies. We envi-
sion a personalized rating methodology for chatbots that re-
lies on separate rating modules for each issue, and users’ de-
tected priority orderings among the issues, to generate an ag-
gregate personalized rating for the trustworthiness of a chat-
bot for a certain user profile. We focus on 4 issues: Fairness
and bias (B), Information leakage (IL), Hate and Abusive
language (AL), and Conversation Complexity (CC). Table 1
illustrates these issues on some dialog datasets. However,
our framework and methodology is general and can be ex-
tended to other issues.
We make the following contributions: (a) introduce the
notion of a contextualized rating of the trustworthiness of a
chatbot; (b) propose a method to compute the rating by using
relative importance rankings over issues, provided by users;
(c) present an architecture to implement the rating approach
as a service; (d) integrate the method with a live chatbot; (e)
evaluate our approach on four dialog datasets and represen-
tative user profiles which we validate in a user survey.
Dialog Systems and Response Generation
A dialog is made up of a series of turns, where each turn is a
series of utterances by one or more participants playing one
or more roles. For example, in the customer support setting,
the roles are the customer and the support chatbot.
The core problem in building chatbots is that of dialog
management (DM), i.e., creating useful dialog responses to
the user’s utterances (McTear, Callejas, and Griol 2016).
There are many approaches to tackle DM in literature, in-
cluding finite-space, frame-based, inference-based, and sta-
tistical learning-based (Crook 2018; Clark, Fox, and Lappin
2010; Inouye 2004; Young et al. 2013), of which finite-space
and frame-based are the most popular ones with mainstream
developers. In a representative invocation, the user’s utter-
ance is analyzed to detect her intent and a policy for response
is selected. This policy may call for querying a database and
the result of query execution is then used by the response
generator to create a response, usually using some templates.
The system can dynamically create one or more queries,
which involves selecting tables and attributes, filtering val-
ues, and testing for conditions, and assume defaults for miss-
ing values. It may also decide not to answer a request if it
is unsure of the correctness of a query’s result. Note that the
DM module may use one or more domain-specific databases
as well as one or more domain-independent sources like lan-
guage models and word embeddings. The latter has been
found to be a possible source of human bias (Caliskan,
Bryson, and Narayanan 2017).
Trust Issues in Dialog Services
Trust is a very important factor in AI development, deploy-
ment, and usage. Users and stakeholders should be able to
have a justified trust in the AI systems they use, otherwise
they will not adopt them in their everyday life. In general,
there are various dimensions of trust to be considered, that
range from robustness to reliability, and from transparency
to explainability and fairness. We focus on a subset of issues
whose checkers are available and robust.
Abusive Language: An important issue in the usage of a
chatbot is the possibility of hate and abusive speech. This
can make the chatbot unacceptable or inappropriate to some
users, harm people in unintended ways, and expose service
providers to unknown risks and costs. There is a growing
body of work to detect hate speech(Davidson et al. 2017)
and abusive language(Wang et al. 2014) online using words
and phrases which people have annotated. The authors in the
former paper define hate speech as language that is used to
expresses hatred towards a targeted group or is intended to
be derogatory, to humiliate, or to insult the members of the
group. Their checker, which we use in our work, has a logis-
tic regression with L2 regularization to achieve automatic
detection of hate speech and offensive language.
Bias: Another issue with AI services is the presence of bias.
Bias can result in an unfair treatment for certain groups com-
pared to others, which is undesirable and often illegal. There
are many definitions of fairness, each one suitable for cer-
tain scenarios. (Github 2018) introduces notations and a few
definitions of fairness while (Henderson et al. 2017) dis-
cusses bias in dialog systems. Also, (Galhotra, Brun, and
Meliou 2017) introduces a software testing framework for
bias where they use the notions of group and causal bias,
and in (Bellamy et al. 2018) the authors describe a tool to
explore fairness using a sample of data, methods, and crite-
ria. In this paper, we use the bias checker implemented by
(Hutto, Folds, and Appling 2015).
Information Leakage: This issue involves ensuring that in-
formation given by users to a chatbot is not released, even
inadvertently, to other users of the same chatbot or the same
platform. This is further complicated by the fact that over
time, a chatbot may get personalized to a user’s need but
the person may not want to share her personalized informa-
tion with the developers. Moreover, shared information may
spread when other users interact (Kempe, Kleinberg, and
Tardos 2003) over time. We use the framework discussed
in (Henderson et al. 2017) to check this issue.
Conversation Style and Complexity: This issue has to do
with making sure that AI services interact with users in the
most useful and seamless way. If a chatbot responds to user’s
questions with a terminology that the user is not familiar
with, she will not get the required information and will not
be able to solve the problem at hand.
In (Liao, Srivastava, and Kapanipathi 2017), the authors
propose a measure of dialog complexity to characterize how
participants in a conversation use words to express them-
selves (utterances), switch roles and talk iteratively to create
turns, and span the dialog. They measure the complexity of
service dialogs at the levels of utterances, turns and overall
dialogs. The method takes into consideration the concentra-
tion of domain-specific terms as a reflection of user request
specificity, as well as the structure of the dialogs as a re-
flection of user’s demand for (service) actions. We use their
checker for implementation.
Our Setting and the Rating Method
We consider a setting where a dialog system is rated for its
behavior with a list of configurable k issues, such as bias
(B), abusive language (AL), conversation complexity (CC),
and information leakage (IL). The system is conceptually
illustrated in Figure 2. Its inputs are the issues to be con-
sidered, the details of the chatbot to be rated, a user profile,
and the (query) datasets to use for the test, and its output is a
rating for the chatbot, conveying its level of trustworthiness
for a specific user or user’s profile. We will now describe the
modules and steps of the proposed rating methodology:
1. Get individual ratings from issue checkers. We assume
that we have one checker available for each issue, which can
rate the behavior of the dialog system on that issue on a 3-
level trust risk scale: [Low, Medium, High] (High meaning
that the chatbot is not behaving well regarding that issue).
For issues with raw scores in a continuous [0-1] range, we
bin them into the 3-level scale. For k issues, we therefore get
a list with k elements in [Low, Medium, High].
2. Elicit/learn users’ importance orders. The second step
involves the aggregation of the elements of such a list into a
single element from that same scale, in order to get a single
rating for the trustworthiness of the chatbot. We propose to
do that by asking users about the relative importance of the
various issues.
Preference elicitation can be done by asking users about
the relative importance of the various issues (individual-
level modeling) or capturing preferences of people as groups
and validating them via surveys(profile-level modeling).
Individual-level models are accurate but hard to build and
manage (due to privacy considerations) and generalize.
Profile-level models are representative of people who iden-
tify with them and easier to implement. Regardless of the
granularity, we believe that trustworthiness is not an abso-
lute property, but rather relative to each user (or user pro-
file) of a chatbot. We build profile-level user models, vali-
date these models using a survey, and test them on dialog
datasets. New profiles can be added and existing ones up-
dated based on survey responses to capture the preferences
of the user base.
3. If elicitation is done at the user level, aggregate impor-
tance orders from similar users. We would like a single
preference order, not many, so that we can then combine the
rating levels of the various issues according to this single or-
der and therefore get to a single trustworthiness rating for
the chatbot. However, we do not want to aggregate over all
users, but only over similar users, according to some notion
of similarity. In this way, the rating will be personalized for
each user group, which includes users that are similar to each
other. The task is therefore to aggregate several ranked or-
ders. To do this, one can use a voting rule, such as Plurality,
Borda, Approval, Copeland, etc., as defined in voting theory
(Levin and Nalebuff 1995). We worked with user profiles,
and hence, skipped this step.
4. Combine the collective importance order with the in-
dividual issue ratings.
We now move to combine this single importance order
obtained in step 3 with the rating of the individual check-
ers on the issues, obtained in step 1. A very simple combi-
nation method could use the importance levels as weights
for the individual ratings, and then could take the level
(among Low, Medium, and High) which appears the most.
For example, if we have our 4 issues (our B, AL, CC, IL),
rated respectively L, M, M, H, and whose collective im-
portance order is 1 (highest) for B (written Imp(B)), 2
for AL, 3 for CC, 4 for IL, we can count L three times
(since 4 − Imp(B) = 4 − 1 = 3), M three times (since
4− Imp(AL) + 4− Imp(CC) = 2 + 1 = 3) times, and H
zero times (since 4− Imp(IL) = 4− 4 = 0).
We also need to have a tie-breaking rule to choose among
levels with the same score. For example, we could use an op-
timistic approach and choose the lowest level among those
in a tie, or we could be pessimistic and choose the highest
level. If we adopt a pessimistic approach, like we do in our
implementation, in the above example we would select M
(between L and M, that are in a tie) as the final rating for the
chatbot trustworthiness.
5. Perform sensitivity testing.
The overall chatbot rating, obtained via the 4 steps proce-
dure just outlined, could be sensitive to models, data, users
or any combination thereof. To take this into account, we
propose to check if the system has access to alternative
learning models or training data to configure the chatbot, or
to additional users. If so, each combination of them is used
to rerun the procedure in order to get a new rating and check
if the rating varies. The output thus can also assign a type
of rating, conveying a: Trustworthy agent (Type-1), which
starts out trusted with some score (L, M or H) and remains so
even after considering all variants of models, data, and users;
Model-sensitive trustworthy agent (Type-2), which can be
swayed by the selection of a model to exhibit a biased behav-
ior while generating its responses; Data-sensitive trustwor-
thy agent (Type-3), which can be swayed by changing train-
ing data to exhibit a biased behavior; User-sensitive trust-
worthy agent (Type-4), which can be swayed by interaction
with (human) users over time to exhibit a biased behavior; A
sensitive agent (Type-N), which can be swayed with a com-
bination of factors.
Instantiating the method. While describing our methodol-
ogy, the reader may have noticed that there are several di-
mensions along which we can make choices:
• the scale of the individual trust issue ratings (e.g., L M,
Figure 2: Building blocks of our chatbot rating system.
H);
• the elicitation or learning method to collect the impor-
tance orders from the users;
• the granularity of user modeling. For user-level modeling,
the similarity measure to define the user classes and the
choice of the voting rule (e.g., Plurality, Borda, etc.);
• the final aggregation method (e.g., linear combination and
tie breaking rule).
Moreover, a quantitative approach for the importance or-
ders could allow for a higher precision in the final rating,
and a less concise aggregation result may help in terms of
explainability of the rating itself.
Illustration of Method on Common Chatbot
Types
We illustrate our method with two common types of con-
versation systems, one for general chitchat and another one
task-oriented. We will discuss trust issues, apply our method
on these systems, and discuss the output.
Eliza: This is a well-studied general conversation system
created in the 1960s (Weizenbaum 1966; 1976) to model a
patient’s interaction with a Rogerian therapist. It uses cues
from user’s input to generate a response using pre-canned
rules without deeper understanding of the text, or the con-
text of the conversation (Manifestation 2006). Since Eliza
uses pattern recognition on user’s input, it can be easily ma-
nipulated via such text to become abusive (AL) and exhibit
bias (B). Since the chatbot uses input text and scripted rules
to create its response, it preserves the conversation style of
the input, thus behaving well in terms of language complex-
ity (CC). Finally, since it retains no context of a conversa-
tion, thus two users giving the same inputs will get the same
response, leading to no information leakage (IL).
The output of the rating method for an Eliza implementa-
tion will be an aggregated trustworthiness score (L, M or H)
and an explanation of how it was calculated from raw issue
scores. Since this chatbot can be configured with alternative
users, the system can check the chatbot for rating sensitivity
and include the result in the output.
Train Delay Assistant: This is a prototype chatbot meant to
help travelers gather knowledge about train delays and their
impact on travel in India (Mishra, Gaurav, and Srivastava
2018). The Indian train system, which is the fourth largest
transport network in size in the world, carrying over 8 bil-
lion passengers per year, has endemic delays. Hence, it is
important for users to be aware of such delays in order to
better plan their trips. The chatbot allows users to gain tem-
poral and journey insights for trains of interest for anytime
in future. It detects intent from a user’s input to find train,
time and stations of interest, and estimates delay using pre-
learned models, and finally produces a response2.
Given the nature of the domain, this chatbot is expected
to not use a language that a user may consider inappropri-
ate (AL). It is also expected to produce an output that does
not exhibit bias towards a protected variable like gender of
the user (B). The chatbot can exhibit a range of conversation
styles on station names, train numbers and time which the
user may perceive simple or complex. For example, refer-
ence to train stations can be by station codes (e.g., HWH)
or their complete name (Howrah Junction), or even collo-
quial names (Howrah). Similarly, reference to train can be
by codes (e.g., 12312) or names (e.g., Kalka Mail), and time
2Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-wtcAYLYr4
variants (e.g, exact minutes or coarser time units) can cre-
ate a variety of choices. Information leakage (IL) is also an
important consideration, since users may not want to reveal
their travel plans, especially when they are looking to use the
delay information to make train reservations on trains whose
seats are in high demand.
Just like for Eliza, the output of the rating method for the
train chatbot will be an aggregated trustworthiness score (L,
M or H) and an explanation of how it was calculated from
raw issue scores. Sensitivity analysis can be done by config-
uring the train chatbot with various learned models of train
delays, training data of trains, and users.
Prototype Implementation
In the previous section, we demonstrated our rating method
with conversation systems. We now describe an implemen-
tation of our trust rating approach using trust issue checkers
that are publicly available. We conduct rating experiments
with this implementation and report on insights gained. To
model users, we define user profiles of people that share a
common ordering of issues’ importance and validate them
with a user survey. For sensitive testing, we test our chat-
bot rating approach over different user profiles. We have in-
tegrated out approach with a typical chatbot that retrieves
information from a database matching user query. For ex-
periments, we use public dialog corpora as proxy for large
chatbot conversations. We will show that the proposed ap-
proach can reveal issues with chatbots and help with their
wider adoption.
Datasets and Profiles
We use four datasets spanning conversations in service do-
mains where chatbots are deployed. Three are publicly avail-
able while one is proprietary.
Public - Ubuntu technical support(# = 3,318): This cor-
pus is taken from the Ubuntu online support IRC channel,
where users post questions about using Ubuntu. We obtained
the original dataset from (Lowe et al. 2015), and selected 2
months of chatroom logs. We extracted ‘helping sessions’
from the log data, where one person posted a question and
other user(s) provided help. The corpus contain both dyadic
and multi-party dialogs.
Public - Insurance QA (# = 25,499): This corpus contains
questions from insurance customers and answers provided
by insurance professionals. The conversations are in strict
Question-Answer (QA) format (with one turn). The corpus
is publicly available (Feng et al. 2015).
Proprietary - Human Resource bot (# = 3,600): This cor-
pus is collected from an internal company’s deployment of
an HR bot - a virtual assistant on an instant messenger tool
that provides support for new hires. Although the bot does
not engage in continuous conversations (i.e., carrying mem-
ory), it is designed to carry out more natural interactions be-
yond question-and-answer. For example, it can actively en-
gage users in some social small talk.
Public - Restaurant reservation support (# = 2,118): This
corpus contains conversations between human users and a
simulated automated agent that helps users find restaurants
and make reservations. The corpus was released for the Dia-
log State Tracking Challenge 2. (Henderson, Thomson, and
Williams 2014).
For users, instead of collecting importance level ordering
for issues from individuals and then aggregating them, we
consider user profiles, which represent rankings of issues
for typical users. To define the profiles, we proposed issue
rankings for each profile and then we validated them via a
crowd-sourcing approach. The profiles we considered are:
Conversation style oriented users (PCU ): They represent
users experienced in people-to-people conversation, but less
with chatbots or with English, like seniors or non-native En-
glish speakers, for whom we presume that conversation style
is important. The importance level ordering is defined as
(high to low): CC, AL, B, IL.
Fairness-oriented users (PFU ): As name suggests, they
represent users concerned mostly about equal treatment of
people. We define their issue ranking as: B, CC, AL, IL.
Privacy-oriented users (PPU ): They represent users pre-
dominantly concerned with information leakage. We define
their issue ranking as: IL, AL, B, CC.
Abusive language oriented users (PAU ): They represent
users with limited experience with conversations and are
vulnerable, like children, and for whom abusive language
and conversation style are important for adopting technol-
ogy. We define their issue ranking as: AL, CC, B, IL.
Survey to Validate User Profiles
We validated the 4 user profiles described above by sur-
veying 20 people, of which 5 are chatbot/NLP researchers, 2
are regular chatbot users, 12 are casual chatbot users, and 1
is an NLP practitioner (as declared by them). We asked each
person to write their importance order over the 4 issues, to
validate the 4 profiles (by confirming the proposed order or
by writing a counter-proposal), and to tell us about possible
additional issues or profiles to be considered.
For all the four profiles, we then combined the results
from people using Borda count voting method. The results
aligned with our proposed orders for each of the user pro-
files, thus validating our assumption. The percentage of peo-
ple who agreed with the proposed orders is shown is the
chart below:
50%PCU
55%PFU
60%PPU
90%PAU
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%100%
Additional profiles that were mentioned are technology-
savy young people, online shoppers, and non-native English
speakers. The preference order for these profiles were al-
ready captured in above four profiles therefore no new pro-
files were created. Many also suggested to consider chatbot
accuracy and usefulness as additional trust issues.
One can extend this work by conducting more extensive
surveys based on above insights.
Bias Detection Checker (B)
For bias detection, we used the sentence-level bias detection
framework discussed in (Hutto, Folds, and Appling 2015).
Bias (B)
Abusive Language (AL)
C (utt.) C (turn) C (dialog) (CC) In. Leak. (IL)Hate Speech Off. Lang. Neither
AL
(weight = 1) (weight = 0.5) (weight = 0)
Ubuntu 0.063± 0.126 (L) 39 110 61,339 0.0015 (L) 0.767 0.767 0.407 (M) 0.5 (M)
Insurance 0.119± 0.146 (L) 12 1 50,985 0.0002 (L) 0.789 0.789 0.894 (H) 0 (L)
HR 0.050± 0.115 (L) 25 1 18,421 0.0013 (L) 0.801 0.803 0.423 (M) 1 (H)
Restaurant 0.031± 0.097 (L) 0 0 31,012 0 (L) 0.788 0.788 0.518 (M) 1 (H)
Table 2: Intermediate and final scores for issue checkers. Final is indicated by bold and L/M/H mapping in brackets.
In this implementation, given a sentence as input, the bias
checker extracts the structural and linguistics features, such
as sentiment analysis, subjectivity analysis, modality, the use
of factive verbs, hedge phrases, and computes perception of
bias based on a regression model trained on these features.
The model was trained using news data and the output was
on the scale of 0 to 3 where 0 denotes an unbiased behavior
and 3 denotes an extremely biased behavior, respectively.
We scaled the output from 0 to 1 to conform with the scale
of the outputs from other checkers.
Table 1 illustrates and Table 2 (left) reports the bias score
of the datasets in aggregate. We see that scores are low but
the datasets are not free of bias.
Abusive Language Checker (AL)
For the detection of abusive language, we used the method
proposed in (Davidson et al. 2017). The checker gives a 3-
value output (Hate Speech, Offensive Language, and Nei-
ther) which are summed with weights to arrive at the final
score. Table 1 illustrates and Table 2 (middle) shows the dis-
tributions of the scores for each dataset. Note that no Hate
Speech was found in the Restaurant corpus.
Information Leakage Checker (IL)
For information leakage, we use the privacy checker frame-
work discussed in (Henderson et al. 2017). We augment
the data with 10 input-output pairs (keypairs) that repre-
sent sensitive data, which the model should keep secret. We
then train a simple seq2seq dialogue model (Vinyals and
Le 2015) on the data and measure the number of epochs at
which the model achieves more than 0.5 accuracy of elic-
iting the secret information. We tested two cases (1) when
both input and output contained sensitive information, and
(2) when output contained sensitive information and in-
put contained datatype of sensitive information. The model
achieved similar results for both cases. We used case (1) for
the prototype implementation. We mapped the number of
epochs to 0 to 15 (0), 15 to 30 (0.5), and above 30 (1) re-
spectively. For the Ubuntu data-set we could not run the ex-
periment as it was a multi-way communication with major
assumptions needed to form input output pairs. For that data,
we adopted a pessimistic approach and took the privacy is-
sue rating to be (0.5).
Dialog Complexity Checker (CC)
For dialog complexity, we use the complexity checker im-
plemented by (Liao, Srivastava, and Kapanipathi 2017). Ta-
ble 1 illustrates and Table 2 shows the complexity scores
PCU PFU PPU PAU
Ubuntu L L M L
Insurance M L L L
HR L L H L
Restaurant M L H L
Table 3: Profile- based rating of each dialog corpus.
(marked C) for each dataset on the [0,1] scale at utterance,
turn and dialog level of granularities.
User Profile-Based Chat Rating
We now calculate the aggregate rating for the dialog cor-
pus corresponding to each profile. For checkers with raw
scores on continuous [0,1] scale, we bin them as L:[0,0.33),
M[0.33,0.67],(0.67,1] and show in brackets in Table 2. For
each corpus and profile, the raw scores for the four trust is-
sues for each dialog corpus are aggregated according to user
profile importance. Table 3 shows the final result.
From Table 2, we see that the four considered datasets
are not biased (L) and abusive (L), but can be conversation-
ally complex and leak information (have M or H values).
From Table 3, we see that the issue ratings for dialog corpus
vary with user profile. Profiles that considered fairness and
abuse as important see no difference in ratings (PFU and
PAU ). For conversation-oriented users (PCU ), conversation
complexity was important and the domains of insurance and
restaurant have M (medium) rating for them. For privacy-
oriented users (PPU ), the insurance domain has least cause
of concern while HR and Restaurant can be problematic,
since they get an H ratings.
Since overall ratings change with user profiles, the
datasets, as proxy of corresponding chatbots, show that the
agents are User-sensitive trustworthy (Type-4).
Integration of Rating with a Health Chatbot
We have integrated our implementation with a chatbot that
recommends hospitals given user’s query about medical ser-
vices and location using open data. Figure 3 show a snapshot
of interaction.
The chatbot also exposes a REST interface using which,
we have integrated our prototype rating implementation. The
rating user, using a command-line interface, can input their
preferences over issues or select a user profile. As the con-
versation between the rating user and chatbot progresses, is-
2Used ”*” to replace letter ”a” in the original text.
Figure 3: User-interface of a chatbot for exploring hospitals. Our approach is integrated as a commandline utility using its REST
interface.
sue checkers can compute partial results and generate aggre-
gated ratings on utterances (AL, CC) and also provide final
ratings at the end of a dialog or session (AL, CC, B, IL).
Figure 4 show a snapshot of interaction for AL issue. If the
rating user does not want to review rating per conversation,
the rating user can also select a data generator for specific is-
sues. For AL, we use the labeled abuse data from (Davidson
et al. 2017) in the data generator; still, we do not condone
offensive language which is used here only for illustration.
Related Work
The brittleness of machine learning models is well known,
and chatbots represent a specific usage of such models. For
NLP models, (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2018) presented
a method to generate semantically equivalent test cases that
can flip the prediction of learning models. This can be a
cause of concern to application developers for usability rea-
sons, and addressing it can prevent the system from being
exploited by an adversary. In the context of chatbots, the
concern is that its output can be manipulated by changing
the input and this is what the sensitivity test can detect. The
authors in (Henderson et al. 2017) systematically survey a
number of potential ethical issues in dialogue systems built
using learning methods. However, they do not consider a
method to communicate a trustworthiness rating based on
the analysis of such issues.
There is a rich body of work on studying issues influenc-
ing online services and AI methods. In information spread-
ing, the seminal work is described in (Kempe, Kleinberg,
and Tardos 2003) where the authors looked at the spread of
information in social networks and how to maximize it by
engaging the effective influencer nodes. In studying abusive
language online, the authors in (Wang et al. 2014) explore
the prevalence of cursing on Twitter which serves as a plat-
form for utterance and conversation. They found that peo-
ple curse more online than in physical environment, among
same gender, when they are angry or sad, as their activities
increase during the day, and when in relaxed or formal envi-
ronments. But users may not want the chatbots they are in-
teracting with to exhibit the same behavior, especially when
the users are children.
The closest prior work is on rating AI services(Srivastava
and Rossi 2018). There, the authors propose a 2-step bias
rating procedure for invocable one-shot AI services (like
translation service), as well as a composition method to build
sequences of such services. However, that work does not
consider: (a) multiple issues and users, (b) personalized rat-
ing based on users’ ranking of issues, (c) dialog setting of
a series of interactions, and not just a single invocation, and
(d) conversations leading to completion of tasks.
Conclusion
We considered the problem of rating chatbots for trustwor-
thiness based on their behavior regarding ethical issues and
users’ provided trust issue rankings. We defined a general
approach to build such a rating system and implemented a
prototype using four issues (abusive language, bias, infor-
mation leakage, and conversation style). We illustrated it
with two chatbot examples and experimented with four dia-
log datasets. We built user profiles to elicit user preferences
about important trust issues and validated them with surveys.
The experiments show that the rating approach can reveal in-
sights about chatbots customized to user’s trust needs.
We believe that this work is a stepping stone towards gen-
eral, modular, and flexible trust rating approaches for con-
versation systems. It is only by building justified trust that
user, developers and data providers can benefit from, and
contribute to, the use of chatbots for improved and more in-
formed decisions.
Figure 4: Screenshot of approach in action with a live chatbot.
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